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Group-based competition is considered to be a ubiquitous social context in human society.
However, little is known about its potential effects on children’s prosocial behaviors.
To this end, we designed an experiment in which two age groups (2.5–3.5 years
of age and 5.5–6.5 years of age) engaged in an intergroup competition task where
they did a so-called “game” where each child transferred table tennis balls with a
spoon from one container to the other. The non-intergroup competition condition was
identical to the intergroup competition condition with one exception—no intergroup
competition manipulation was involved. Then, they were required to perform two
economic games used to measure their prosocial behaviors. We found that under the
non-intergroup competition condition, as children aged, their behaviors tended to be
more fairness-oriented (such as an increase in egalitarian behaviors). However, under
the intergroup competition condition, children at 2.5–3.5 years of age tended to behave
prosocially towards their ingroup members compared with those who are at 5.5–6.5
years of age. The behavioral pattern under the intergroup competition condition reflects
strengthening prosocial tendencies driven by the intergroup competition in younger
children and simultaneously weakening intergroup competition-driven prosocial tendencies
possibly due to the development of fairness-oriented behaviors in older children. Taken
together, these results point to the importance of considering the effects of competitive
contexts on children’s social behaviors and may have important implications for further
research on the role of competitive contexts in the development of human prosocial
behaviors.
Keywords: prosocial behaviors, egalitarianism, parochial altruism, intergroup competition, cooperation, economic
games, young children
INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behaviors refer to acts that are intended to help or
benefit another individual or group of individuals (Eisenberg and
Fabes, 1998). In our societies, these behaviors are highly valued
and are one of the most important markers of competency in
children. As a result, understanding the development of such
behaviors has been gaining increasing attention over the past
decades (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998; Hay and Cook, 2007).
Accumulating evidence indicates that prosocial behaviors have
deep roots in human lifespan development. It has been revealed
that prosocial behaviors emerge by the end of infancy in human
ontogeny (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998;
Warneken and Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007; Schmidt
and Sommerville, 2011; Sloane et al., 2012). For example, young
children between 12 to 18 months of age have begun to display
prosocial behaviors, such as giving their toys to their parents,
even without being reinforced by external praise (Dunfield et al.,
2011). Moreover, the development of such behaviors continues as
children gradually mature (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Fehr et al.,
2008; Bauer et al., 2014a; Ongley et al., 2014).
More importantly, advances in understanding of
developmental trajectories in human prosocial behaviors
also help understand the roles of contextual factors in shaping
children’s prosocial behaviors. For instance, children’s social
companions (de Guzman et al., 2008), parental care (Stewart and
McBride-Chang, 2000; Bauer et al., 2014b), and cultural diversity
(Rogof, 2003; Bronfenbrenner and Morris, 2006; Eisenberg et al.,
2006; Chen and Eisenberg, 2012; House et al., 2013) have been
shown to influence children’s prosocial behaviors. Among those
contextual factors, intergroup competition is considered to be
a ubiquitous social context in human society, which has been
shown to play an important role in individuals’ behaviors (Stein,
1976; Bornstein, 2003; Simmel, 2010). For instance, empirical
studies in adults reveal that intergroup competition enhances
ingroup cohesion, whereby individuals behave prosocially
towards members of their own group relative to outgroup
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members (Bornstein et al., 2002; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport,
2006; Blattman, 2009; Puurtinen and Mappes, 2009; Benard,
2012; Hugh-Jones and Zultan, 2012; Bauer et al., 2014a). As a
result, group-based competition has been recognized as one of
the most important driving forces in the evolution of human
prosocial behaviors (Bowles, 2006). However, little is still known
about the potential effects of intergroup competition on prosocial
behaviors in children.
The present study aimed at exploring the possible effects
of intergroup competition on children’s prosocial behaviors.
To achieve this goal, we designed an experiment in which
different age groups (2.5–3.5 years of age and 5.5–6.5 years
of age) engaged in an intergroup competition task, which was
followed by two economic games (a sharing game and an envy
game) used to measure their prosocial behaviors. Specifically,
in the intergroup competition task, two equal-sized groups
under intergroup competition and non-intergroup competition
conditions engaged in a so-called “game” where each child
transferred table tennis balls with a spoon from one container
to the other, and the number of balls successfully transferred
by all members of each group within 20 s was counted.
The non-intergroup competition condition was identical to
the intergroup competition condition with one exception—
no intergroup competition manipulation was involved. In the
present study, this non-intergroup competition condition served
as a benchmark condition because of unequal sample size between
the intergroup competition and the non-intergroup competition
condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 328 preschoolers from 5 private preschools
(Mai Ke Rui kindergarten, Havard Star kindergarten, Hai Xia
Xin Cheng kindergarten, Liu Cheng Mei Yu kindergarten, and
Duolaimi kindergarten in Chengdu, China). Seven of them were
excluded from the final data analysis due to either their inability
to follow decision rules (n = 3) or a potential confounding effect
caused by the presence of their teachers during the experiment (n
= 4). The remaining 321 participants were divided into 2 groups:
157 young children (2.5–3.5 years of age) and 164 old children
(5.5–6.5 years of age). Due to the fact that gender difference
in distributive behaviors have been observed in young children
(Stewart and McBride-Chang, 2000; Ongley et al., 2014), the
present study included almost half males (n = 162) and half
females (n = 159) (Table 1). This research was approved by ethics
committees of these 5 preschools.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Intergroup competition manipulation
The intergroup competition task included two conditions:
an intergroup competition condition and a non-intergroup
competition condition. Under the intergroup competition
condition, participants (n = 250) engaged in an intergroup
competition task, which has been widely employed to investigate
the effects of group-based competition on human behaviors
(Bornstein et al., 2002; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006;
Halevy et al., 2008; Benard, 2012; Böhm and Rockenbach,
2013). One important feature of such intergroup competition
manipulation in the present study is that it could result in two
consequences (winning and losing) based on outcomes of such
between-group rivalry, whereby both winning groups (n = 125)
and losing groups (n = 125) can be formed accordingly. This
allows us to additionally study effects of group-based winning and
losing experiences on children’s prosocial behaviors in the present
study.
More specifically, under the intergroup competition condition,
six children from the same classroom were led by their teachers to
a quiet room. They were randomly divided into two equal-sized
groups. Following previous studies in which children’s group
affiliation was identified using different colors (Bigler et al., 1997;
Patterson and Bigler, 2006; Buttelmann and Böhm, 2014), colored
ribbons (in red or blue) on children’s arm were used to mark their
group affiliation (a red group and a blue group) in the present
study. Afterwards, a female research assistant explained the
“game” procedures to them. The explanation was repeated when
necessary to ensure that all children fully understood the rules.
Then, each group engaged in their teamwork simultaneously—
each child transferred table tennis balls with a spoon from one
container to the other, and the number of balls successfully
transferred by all members of each group within 20 s was counted.
Building on the outcomes of the between-group rivalry, each of
these two groups could be identified to be either a winning or a
losing group. Each member of the winning group was rewarded a
sticker in front of the losing group who received no reward. These
two competing groups engaged in their teamwork in the same
room. During the competition, two female research assistants
counted and kept records of the performance of each group
respectively.
In contrast, the treatment under the non-intergroup
competition condition (n = 71) was identical to the intergroup
competition condition described above with one exception—no
intergroup competition manipulation was involved. Specifically,
six children from the same classroom were randomly divided
into two equal-sized groups. Colored ribbons (in red or blue)
on children’s arm were used to identify their group affiliation.
Then, each group engaged in their teamwork simultaneously—
each child transferred table tennis balls with a spoon from
one container to the other, and the number of balls successfully
transferred by all members of each group within 20 s was counted.
In order to control for the potential implicit competition arising
from the observation on other group’s performance, both groups
could not see each other’s performance. Furthermore, no explicit
information about the outcomes of between-group rivalry was
delivered to each group in this control condition. Note that the
sample size under the non-intergroup competition condition
(n = 71) were not equal to that under the intergroup competition
condition (n = 250). The unequal sample size between these
two conditions makes it less sensitive to exploring the possible
interaction effects between intergroup competition and age.
In spite of this, the non-intergroup competition condition can
still serve as an important benchmark condition against which
participants’ behaviors can be compared and therefore, help
illustrate effects of intergroup competition on children’s prosocial
behaviors.
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Table 1 | Structure of the intergroup competition task.
Condition Outcome Age groups A B C D E Total
Intergroup competition Win 2.5–3.5 15 15 12 9 11 62
5.5–6.5 14 10 12 12 15 63
Total 29 25 24 21 26 125
Loss 2.5–3.5 15 15 12 9 9 60
5.5–6.5 14 12 12 12 15 65
Total 29 27 24 21 24 125
Non-intergroup competition – 2.5–3.5 12 12 11 35
5.5–6.5 12 12 12 36
Total 24 24 23 71
A, B, C, D, and E denote five preschools, and numbers in each of the five columns are the number of participants in each experimental condition and each age group.
Participants under the non-intergroup competition condition were only recruited from C, D, and E preschools. Seven participants were excluded from the final data
analysis: In A, two participants were excluded due to the presence of their teachers. In B, one participant did not follow rules during the task, and one participant
was excluded because of their teacher’s presence. In E, two participants were excluded due to their inability to follow the instruction and the other one participant
was excluded because of their teacher’s presence.
Economic games measuring children’s prosocial behaviors
To examine the effects of the intergroup competition on
children’s prosocial behaviors, the present study adopted a
so-called “choice paradigm” to measure how children made
resource allocations between self and in-group partners. We
used a sharing game and an envy game to measure children’s
prosocial behaviors, since these two economic games have been
widely used in previous studies investigating the developmental
changes in human prosocial behaviors (Fehr et al., 2008;
Warneken et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2014a; Sheskin et al.,
2014a).
Specifically, following the intergroup competition task, each
participant was led by a research assistant to a different quiet
room to do these two economic games. In the sharing game
(Figure 1), participants chose between (1, 1)—one piece of toy
for self and the other for an in-group partner—and (2, 0)—
two pieces of toys for self and none for an in-group partner.
Since the former personal payoffs was less than the latter one
in the sharing game, choosing (1, 1) indicated that participants’
behaviors were mainly driven by their egalitarian motives, while
choosing (2, 0) indicated that their behaviors were mainly driven
by their proself motives. In the envy game (Figure 1), they could
choose between (1, 1)—one piece of toy for self and the other
for an in-group partner—and (1, 2)—one piece of toy for self
and 2 for an in-group partner. In this game, the personal payoffs
of the two choices were identical, but the sum of such payoffs
in the latter choice (3 pieces) was larger than that in the former
one (2 pieces). As a result, choosing (1, 1) in this game indicated
that their behaviors were mainly driven by either their egalitarian
motives or by their aversion to disadvantageous inequality, while
choosing (1, 2) indicated that their behaviors were mainly
driven by either their social welfare concerns or altruistic
motives.
RESULTS
INTERGROUP COMPETITION CONDITION
The sharing game
Our data analysis on participants’ behaviors in the sharing game
revealed that there were 75% of children who chose (1, 1),
significantly above a chance level (50%) (Binomial test,
FIGURE 1 | Economic games employed in the present study.
Participants made choices in a sharing game and an envy game. Soft toys
(Angry Bird) and flash water glitter balls (Happy Sheep) were used as
distributional resources in these two games, respectively. Between-game
differences in toys may help rule out satiation effects, and within-game
homogeneity of toys may help control for individual differences in
preferences for colors and styles which could potentially affect children’s
decision-making behaviors.
p < 0.001, n = 250), suggesting that young children who
experienced the intergroup competition behaved prosocially
towards their in-group partners. This was further substantiated
by our analyses on the egalitarian choices within each group
(Binomial test: p < 0.001, n = 122, for 2.5–3.5 years of age;
p < 0.001, n = 128, for 5.5–6.5 years of age). However, the effects
of the winning and losing outcomes on egalitarian choices in
this game were not statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test,
p = 0.88, n = 250), 76% of children in the losing group and 74% of
children in the winning group chose (1, 1). Neither did we observe
a significant gender difference in egalitarian choices, because the
frequencies of egalitarian choices by females (76%) and males
(75%) were almost identical (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00, n = 250).
More importantly, we observed a pronounced age effect: the
frequency of egalitarian choices made by children at 2.5–3.5 years
of age (82%) in this game was significantly higher than that made
by their old counterparts (69%) (Figure 2) (Fisher’s exact test,
p< 0.05, n = 250), indicating that children at 2.5–3.5 years of age
tend to share their resources with their in-group partners after
experiencing the intergroup competition. Finally, our statistical
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FIGURE 2 | The effects of intergroup competition on prosocial choices
in two economic games. The black solid lines denote the percentage of
egalitarian choices (1,1) in the sharing game, while the gray dashed lines
denote the percentage of altruistic choices (1,2) in the envy game. Under
the intergroup competition condition and the non-intergroup competition
condition, participants’ choices determine an ingroup member’s payoffs.
Under the intergroup competition condition, the percentage of egalitarian
choices (1,1) vs. selfish choices (2,0) in the sharing game decreases with
age and the percentage of altruistic choices (1,2) vs. the egalitarian choices
(1,1) also decreases with age in the envy game. Under the non-intergroup
competition, the percentage of egalitarian choices increases with age,
while the percentage of altruistic choices decreases with age, indicating
that young children tend to be more egalitarian as their age increases.
analysis did not reveal a significant interaction effect between
competition outcomes (winning vs. losing) and age (Wald’s χ2 =
0.726, p > 0.05), indicating that the observed age effect on choice
behaviors in the sharing game did not depend on the competition
outcomes.
The envy game
In the envy game, 60% of our participants chose (1, 1), which
was significantly different from the chance level of 50% (Binomial
test, p < 0.005, n = 250), indicating that these children tried to
avoid the disadvantageous inequality. Our subsequent analysis on
each age group’s behaviors found that the frequency of egalitarian
choices for children at 2.5–3.5 years of age was only 2% above
the chance level (50%) (Binomial test, p = 0.79, n = 122). In
contrast, the frequency of egalitarian choices for children at 5.5–
6.5 years of age was 17% above the chance level (50%) (Binomial
test, p< 0.001, n = 128). Because the option (1, 2) only increased
their partners’ payoffs, these results suggested that children at 5.5–
6.5 years of age could be more aversive to the disadvantageous
inequality and thus tended to be more egalitarian than children
at 2.5–3.5 years of age. This was further supported by the direct
comparison of frequencies of the (1, 2) choice between these two
age groups (48% for younger children, 33% for older children;
Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.01, n = 250) (Figure 2). Moreover, the
comparisons of the winning (42%) and losing (38%) outcomes
on altruistic choices and such choices between females (40%) and
males (41%) did not reveal significant effects (Fisher’s exact test;
p = 0.61 for effects of the winning and losing outcomes, p = 1.00
for the gender differences; n = 250). Finally, our statistical analysis
did not reveal a significant interaction effect between competition
outcomes (winning vs. losing) and age (Wald’s χ2 = 0.469,
p > 0.05), indicating that the observed age effect on choice
behaviors in the envy game did not depend on the competition
outcomes.
NON-INTERGROUP COMPETITION CONDITION (THE BENCHMARK
CONDITION)
Given that the non-intergroup competition condition provides a
benchmark against which the observations under the intergroup
competition can be compared, we explored participants’
behaviors under this benchmark condition. Under the non-
intergroup competition condition, the majority of participants
were egalitarian in the sharing game. Specifically, 75% of the
children chose (1, 1), which is significantly different from the
chancel level (50%) (Binomial test, p< 0.001, n = 71). Moreover,
our subsequent analysis on the age effect on egalitarian choices
revealed that the frequency of egalitarian choices increased
slightly with age (72% at 2.5–3.5 years of age and 76% at 5.5–
6.5 years of age) (Figure 2), although the difference between
these two age groups was not statistically significant. This
observation is consistent with previous studies showing the
frequency of egalitarian choices increases with age (Fehr et al.,
2008). In the envy game, we found that the frequency (44%)
of altruistic choices (1, 2) was below the chance level (50%),
although it did not reach statistical significance (Binomial test,
p = 0.342, n = 71). Moreover, our subsequent analysis on
the age effect on the frequency of altruistic choices (1, 2)
showed that the frequency of altruistic choices decreased with
age (46% at 2.5–3.5 years of age and 42% at 5.5–6.5 years
of age). This observation in the envy game is also consistent
with previous studies showing that the frequency of altruistic
choices decreases with age (Fehr et al., 2008), indicating that as
children age, they tend to be more egalitarian during bargaining
activities. Finally, gender differences in both the egalitarian
choices (1, 1) in the sharing game (Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.00,
n = 250) and altruistic choices (1, 2) in the envy game
were not significant (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.47, n = 250)
(Figure 2).
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INTERGROUP COMPETITION AND
NON-INTERGROUP COMPETITION CONDITION (THE BENCHMARK
CONDITION)
In addition, we further performed two separate logistic regression
analyses on prosocial behaviors in these two economic games. For
the sharing game, the analysis revealed a significant main effect
of age (Wald’s χ2 = 5.735, p < 0.05). However, a main effect of
competition (Wald’s χ2 = 1.002, p > 0.05) and the interaction
between competition and age (Wald’s χ2 = 1.496, p > 0.05)
did not reach statistical significance. Our subsequent analysis
revealed a tendency for 2.5–3.5 year-old children to behave more
prosocially under the intergroup competition condition (82%)
than under the non-intergroup competition condition (74%). In
contrast, there was a tendency for 5.5–6.5 year-olds to behave less
prosocially under the intergroup competition condition (69%)
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than under the non-intergroup competition condition (75%)
(Figure 2). With regard to the envy game, the main effect of
age was observed (Wald’s χ2 = 6.210, p < 0.05). However, the
main effect of competition and interaction between age (Wald’s
χ2 = 6.210, p > 0.05) and competition (Wald’s χ2 = 0.795, p
> 0.05) did not reach any significance. Our subsequent analysis
revealed a relatively weak tendency for 2.5–3.5 year-olds to behave
more prosocially under the intergroup competition condition
(49%) than under the non-intergroup competition condition
(46%) and in contrast, a tendency for 5.5–6.5 year-old children to
behave less prosocially under the intergroup competition (33%)
than under the non-intergroup competition condition (42%)
(Figure 2).
BEHAVIORAL TYPES
If we took a between-game perspective, our participants’
behaviors could be classified into three different behavioral types
(egalitarian, altruist, and proself) based on motives underlying
their decisions in these two games, as described in previous
studies (Fehr et al., 2008; Bauer et al., 2014a). Under the
intergroup competition condition, the percentage of these three
behavioral types across both groups was presented in Figure 3.
Children who chose (1, 1) in both sharing and envy games
were defined as egalitarians. Our analysis on this behavioral type
showed that the percentage of egalitarians in children at 2.5–3.5
years of age (43%) was similar to that in children at 5.5–6.5
years of age (42%) (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.90, n = 250). In
contrast, with respect to altruists (those who chose (1, 1) in the
sharing game and (1, 2) in the envy game), we found that there
were more altruists in children at 2.5–3.5 years of age (39%)
than in children at 5.5–6.5 years of age (27%) after experiencing
intergroup competition (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.05, n = 250).
Finally, there were less proselfs (those who chose (2, 0) in the
sharing game and (1, 1) in the envy game) in children at 2.5–3.5
years of age (8%) than in children at 5.5–6.5 years of age (25%)
(Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001, n = 250) (Figure 3). In addition,
neither the winning and losing outcomes nor the gender had
pronounced effects on these three behavioral types.
Under the non-intergroup competition condition, our analysis
on the egalitarian behavioral type showed that the percentage of
egalitarians increased with age (40% of children at 2.5–3.5 years
of age and 44% of children at 5.5–6.5 years of age) (Figure 3),
consistent with previous findings (Fehr et al., 2008; Bauer et al.,
2014b). Similarly, with respect to altruists (those who chose (1, 1)
in the sharing game and (1, 2) in the envy game), we found
that there was a decreasing trend for children to be altruists
as age increased (34% of children at 2.5–3.5 years of age and
31% of children at 5.5–6.5 years of age) (Figure 3). Finally, the
percentages of proselfs (those who chose (2, 0) in the sharing
game and (1, 1) in the envy game) in children at 2.5–3.5 years of
age (14.3%) and in children at 5.5–6.5 years of age (13.9%) were
almost identical (Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
Studying the development of human prosocial behaviors is critical
to understanding large-scale cooperation in human society. Our
analysis of children’s behaviors in the sharing game and envy game
FIGURE 3 | The effects of intergroup competition on behavioral types.
The black solid lines denote the percentage of each of three behavioral
types under the intergroup competition condition, while the gray dashed
lines denote the percentage of each of these behavioral types under the
non-intergroup competition condition. Under the intergroup competition
condition, the percentage of egalitarians in children at 2.5–3.5 years of age
is similar to that in children at 5.5–6.5 years of age, while under the
non-intergroup competition condition, the percentage of egalitarians
increases with age. It is obvious that the percentage of altruists is higher in
younger children than in older children under the intergroup and
non-intergroup competition conditions. The percentage of proselfs is
significantly lower in younger children than in older children under the
intergroup competition condition, but these behavioral type decreases with
age under the non-intergroup competition condition.
revealed that under the non-intergroup competition condition,
children tended to be more egalitarian towards their ingroup
members as their age increased, indicating the development
of fairness-oriented behaviors with age. For one thing, this
observation is consistent with a recent study showing that
parochial altruism is already present in children of preschool age
and increases with age (Fehr et al., 2008; Buttelmann and Böhm,
2014). For another, this finding is also consistent with previous
findings showing that as children age, their behaviors supporting
their interaction with others become more fair (Sheskin et al.,
2014b). For instance, as children grow up, they tend to pay
more attention to each member’s inputs and outputs of their
groups and distribute resources based on group members’ efforts
during the cooperative tasks (Leventhal et al., 1973; Lerner,
1974; Sigelman and Waitzman, 1991; McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al.,
1994; Almås et al., 2010). The development of fairness-oriented
behaviors has also been observed when children engage in
bargaining activities. For instance, previous studies found that
as children aged, they were more averse to disadvantageous
inequality during bargaining activities (Murnighan and Saxon,
1998; Blake and McAuliffe, 2011; Sheskin et al., 2014a). This is
corroborated by recent studies showing that as children aged,
they tended to be more fair and egalitarian in economic games
(e.g., Fehr et al., 2008) and to punish selfishness when they were
involved in third party punishment (Jordan et al., 2014). Together,
our observation under the non-intergroup competition adds to
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a growing literature on the development of strategic-oriented
behaviors in children.
In contrast, under the intergroup competition condition,
children at 2.5–3.5 years of age tended to behave prosocially
towards members of their own group after experiencing the
intergroup competition compared with children at 5.5–6.5
years of age. This seems to be at odds with the overall trend
in the literature showing that as children age, they tend to be
more egalitarian (Fehr et al., 2008). Why do young children
behave differently between the intergroup competition and the
non-intergroup competition? The preliminary observations
below may provide some insights on the possible mechanisms
underlying the role of competitive contexts in shaping children’s
prosocial behaviors. For one thing, we found a tendency
for 2.5–3.5 year-olds to behave more prosocially under the
intergroup competition condition than under the non-intergroup
competition condition, regardless of types of economic games
(Figure 2). It has been argued that humans seems to be
predisposed to be prosocial to other social members (Gintis
et al., 2003; Bowles, 2006; Warneken and Tomasello, 2009)
and therefore, this result seemed to reflect the enhanced
prosocial instincts by the intergroup competition in younger
children’s behaviors. For another, we also observed a tendency
for 5.5–6.5 year-olds to behave less prosocially under the
intergroup competition condition than under the non-
intergroup competition condition, regardless of economic
games (Figure 2). The weakening intergroup competition-
driven prosocial tendencies may be due to the development
of fairness-oriented behaviors in children. As a result, these
results under the intergroup competition seemed to reflect the
strengthening prosocial tendencies towards ingroup members
driven by the intergroup competition in younger children and
simultaneously the weakening intergroup competition-driven
prosocial tendencies possibly due to the development of fairness-
oriented behaviors in older children. Although our explanations
about the possible mechanisms underlying the influence of
competitive contexts in prosocial behaviors in young children
need to be treated cautiously, the observations in the present
study may still help stimulate further studies in this field.
Group-based competition is an ubiquitous nature of human
groups (Stein, 1976; Simmel, 2010), and is viewed as one of
the most important driving forces in the evolution of human
prosociality (Bowles, 2006). Thus, studying effects of between-
group rivalries (e.g., the relation between intergroup competition
and cohesion) on children’s prosocial behaviors is of importance
to understanding human social behaviors (Bornstein, 2003). The
present study is among the few to study intergroup competition-
cohesion relation from a developmental perspective. Although
existing studies have documented how negative experiences (e.g.,
war, natural disaster) affected children’s prosocial behaviors
(Wright, 1943; Li et al., 2013; Bauer et al., 2014a), evidence
regarding effects of success or triumph on coping with adversity
is rare. The unique advantage of the intergroup competition
paradigm employed in the present study lies in that it not
only facilitated our inquiry into the effects of strong group
affiliation in preschoolers’ decision making, but also allowed
us to study the full picture of behavioral consequences of
both winning and losing outcomes arising from the intergroup
competition.
Our observation that the frequency of prosocial behaviors
in the winning groups was similar to that in the losing
groups suggests that kindergartner’s prosocial behaviors were
not sensitive to outcomes of the intergroup competition. This
finding extends existing literature on the effects of intergroup
competition or conflicts on the development of human prosocial
behaviors. Collaboration among in-group members is one of
prominent features of the intergroup competition paradigm
adopted in the present study. Rewards were distributed evenly to
group members who collaborated on winning the competition
(i.e., each member was rewarded a sticker). Such setting is similar,
if not identical, to the manipulation of collaborative outcomes
observed in Warneken et al. (2011). Thus, the observation that
young children in the winning groups behaved prosocially to
in-group members is actually in line with findings from Warneken
et al. (2011). In parallel, our observation that young children
in the losing groups were also prosocial towards their in-group
peers seemed to be congruent with observations in Wright (1943),
indicating that frustration from experiences of loss in contests and
situation where desirable toys were inaccessible may increase in-
group cohesion among young children.
Culture could be another factor contributing to high frequency
of egalitarian choices in the sharing game in our study. It has
been shown that children growing up in collective cultures were
more prosocial than those from individualistic cultures (Rao and
Stewart, 1999; Rochat et al., 2009). Chinese children in the present
study could be more inclined to viewing them embedded in close
relations with peers, whereby they were more likely to consider
in-group peers’ benefits.
Another factor that might also contribute to the observed
age differences in prosocial behaviors is related to the One-
Child Policy (OCP) introduced in 1979 to curb the population
growth in China. OCP has been beneficial to the development
of the country, but has also resulted in some issues (Hesketh
and Zhu, 1997). One of them is concerned with the propensity
of these children which is coined as “little emperor syndrome”
(e.g., spoiled, egocentric). A recent experimental study indicated
that the post-OCP children showed less interpersonal trust and
risk-seeking than their pre-OCP counterparts (Cameron et al.,
2013). Other studies also indicated that these only children were
more self-centered than the sibling children in China (Jiao et al.,
1986; Wang et al., 1998). Because the majority of participants
in the present study involved such only children, one might
speculate from socialization perspective that children grown up
in this collectivistic culture could still consider less about others’
need in comparison with their younger counterparts. In line with
this speculation, a recent study published in Chinese journal
showed that the children’s offers in an ultimatum game decreased
significantly with age (8, 11, 13, and 18 years of age) (Zhu et al.,
2008). Whether such social policy as OCP caused age effects
observed in our study is still an open question. As such, future
efforts will be needed to figure out such age effects caused by the
intergroup competition experiences so that we may have a clearer
picture of the developmental patterns of prosocial behaviors in
Chinese contexts.
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The present study inevitably has some limitations: first,
since this study was not conducted longitudinally, the observed
differences may not reflect true developmental differences.
Second, children’s prosocial behaviors are believed to be
influenced by such factors as family incomes, parents’ education,
and parenting styles, but we have not linked those variables to the
performance observed in the present study due to privacy policy
of these preschools. To better understand children’s prosocial
behaviors, it will be worthwhile to devote resources and efforts to
uncover how these factors influence the development of prosocial
behaviors. Third, each child was led by a female research assistant
to make decisions in economic games, though the third-party
influence was held constant across individuals and experimental
conditions, we still cannot rule out the possibility of third-party
influence on children’s prosocial behaviors. Our next step would
be to control for this factor by letting children to make decisions
individually. Finally, only Chinese children were involved in the
present study. It remains unclear whether our findings would
generalize to other populations. This is an important question
because cultural diversity (e.g., cultural individualism vs. cultural
collectivism) has been shown to play an important role in
prosocial behaviors in children (Rao and Stewart, 1999; Rochat
et al., 2009). Thus, it would be interesting to take it into account
in future research.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we found that after experiencing the intergroup
competition, children at 2.5–3.5 years of age tended to
behave prosocially towards their ingroup members compared
with those who are at 5.5–6.5 years of age. The behavioral
pattern under the intergroup competition condition reflected
the strengthening prosocial tendencies towards ingroup members
driven by the intergroup competition in younger children and
simultaneously the weakening intergroup competition-driven
prosocial tendencies possibly due to the development of fairness-
oriented behaviors in older children. Therefore, our results point
to the importance of considering the effects of competitive
contexts on the development of human prosocial behaviors.
We think that the preliminary findings from our present study
could shed light on the potential mechanisms underlying the
role of competitive contexts in shaping children’s prosocial
behaviors and thus may help stimulate further studies in
this field.
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